When and How the Punishment Must Fit the Crime

George Mailath, Volker Nocke and Lucy White

No 5225, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: In repeated normal-form (simultaneous-move) games, simple penal codes (Abreu, 1986, 1988) permit an elegant characterization of the set of subgame-perfect outcomes. We show that the logic of simple penal codes fails in repeated extensive-form games. By means of examples, we identify two types of settings in which a subgame-perfect outcome may be supported only by a profile with the property that the continuation play after a deviation is tailored not only to the identity of the deviator, but also to the nature of the deviation.

Keywords: simple penal code; subgame perfect equilibrium; repeated extensive game; optimal punishment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 C72 C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Related works:
Journal Article: WHEN AND HOW THE PUNISHMENT MUST FIT THE CRIME (2017)
Working Paper: When and How the Punishment Must Fit the Crime (2015)
Working Paper: When and how the punishment must fit the crime (2015)
Working Paper: When and How the Punishment Must Fit the Crime (2015)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_5225

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