Secrecy Jurisdictions

Guttorm Schjelderup

No 5239, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: This paper surveys tax haven legislation and links the literature on tax havens to the literature on asymmetric information. I argue that the core aim of tax haven legislation is to create private information (secrecy) for the users of tax havens. This leads to moral hazard and transaction costs in non-havens. The business model of tax havens is illustrated by using Mauritius and Jersey as case studies. I also provide several real world examples of how secrecy jurisdictions lead to inefficient market outcomes and breach of regulations in non-haven countries. Both developed and developing countries are harmed, but the consequences seem most detrimental to developing countries.

Keywords: tax havens; secrecy; private information; moral hazard (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F23 H25 O10 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Secrecy jurisdictions (2016)
Working Paper: Secrecy Jurisdictions (2015)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_5239

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