Labor Market Equilibrium with Public Employment Agency

Christian Holzner and Makoto Watanabe

No 5245, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: The Public Employment Agency (PEA) provides intermediation services in the labor market. We investigate the implications of having such an additional market place using a tractable search model, and explain why only a fraction of firms use the PEA as search channel despite its free service. We highlight the registering firms’ tradeoff between the negative selection of applicants and the lower wages possible at the PEA. Our theory also explains which job-types are more likely to be registered. We test these theoretical predictions empirically using the German Job Vacancy Survey and the German Socio-Economic Panel and find strong support for them.

Keywords: intermediation; public employment agency; labor search (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J60 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.cesifo.org/DocDL/cesifo1_wp5245.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Labor Market Equilibrium with Public Employment Agency (2015)
Working Paper: Labor Market Equilibrium with Public Employment Agency (2015)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_5245

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Klaus Wohlrabe ().