The Dynamics of Dictator Behavior

Markus Sass, Florian Timme and Joachim Weimann

No 5348, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: Choosing between selfish and non-selfish behavior in real life is a repeated decision with var-ying time spans between repetitions. To learn more about the dynamics of altruistic behavior, we use repeated standard dictator experiments. The dynamics of prosocial behavior in these experiments depends on the strength of several effects that influence gift giving in experiments of this kind. In particular, we investigate how social distance influences behavior in repeated dictator experiments and what kinds of behavioral dynamics are covered by a social norm. Fur-thermore, we vary the number of repetitions of the dictator game and the length of the time span between the repetitions (from two hours up to two weeks). We identify the moral self-licensing effect as an important determinant of the behavioral dynamics in repeated dictator games and show that this is covered by a social norm.

Keywords: dictator game; image effect; repeated experiments; dynamics of behavior; moral self-licensing (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 C91 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

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