Voluntary Disclosure of Evaded Taxes - Increasing Revenues, or Increasing Incentives to Evade?

Dominika Langenmayr

No 5349, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: Many countries apply lower fines to tax evading individuals when they voluntarily disclose the tax evasion they committed. I model such voluntary disclosure mechanisms theoretically and show that while such mechanisms increase the incentive to evade taxes, they nevertheless increase tax revenues net of administrative costs. I confirm the importance of administrative costs in a survey of German competent local tax authorities. I then test the effects of voluntary disclosure on the tax evasion decision, using the introduction of the 2009 offshore voluntary disclosure program in the U.S. for identification. The analysis confirms that the introduction of voluntary disclosure increases tax evasion.

Keywords: tax evasion; voluntary disclosure; self-reporting (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H24 H26 K42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (14)

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Related works:
Chapter: Voluntary Disclosure of Evaded Taxes—Increasing Revenue, or Increasing Incentives to Evade? (2017)
Journal Article: Voluntary disclosure of evaded taxes — Increasing revenue, or increasing incentives to evade? (2017)
Working Paper: Voluntary disclosure of evaded taxes - Increasing revenue, or increasing incentives to evade? (2015)
Working Paper: Voluntary Disclosure of Evaded Taxes - Increasing Revenues, or Increasing Incentives to Evade? (2015)
Working Paper: Voluntary Disclosure of Evaded Taxes - Increasing Revenues, or Increasing Incentives to Evade? (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_5349

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