An Equilibrium Analysis of Marriage, Divorce and Risk-Sharing

Dan Anderberg

No 555, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: This paper considers family formation and reciprocity-based cooperation in the form of sharing of earnings-risk. While risk sharing is one benefit to marriage it is also limited by divorce risk. With search in the marriage market there may be multiple equilibria diering not only in divorce rates but also in the role of marriage in providing informal insurance. Publicly provided insurance, despite potential equilibrium multiplicity, is shown to aect family formation and financial cooperation monotonically. Some aspects of the model are then tested using international survey data and a bivariate probit model with sample selection.

Keywords: Marriage; divorce; risk-sharing (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.cesifo.org/DocDL/cesifo_wp555.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: An Equilibrium Analysis of Marriage, Divorce and Risk-Sharing (2002)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_555

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Klaus Wohlrabe ().