Cooperation on Climate-Change Mitigation

Charles Mason, Stephen Polasky and Nori Tarui

No 5698, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: We model countries’ choice of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions as a dynamic game. Emissions generate immediate benefits to the emitting country but also increase atmospheric GHG concentrations that negatively affect present and future welfare of all countries. Because there are no international institutions capable of enforcing environmental agreements on sovereign nations, we analyze self-enforcing climate-change treaties that are supportable as subgame perfect equilibria. In simulations based on current conditions, we explore the structure of a selfenforcing agreement that achieves efficient climate change policy.

Keywords: international agreements; climate change; differential games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 Q54 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Journal Article: Cooperation on climate-change mitigation (2017)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_5698

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