Self-Enforcing Agreements under Unequal Nationally Determined Contributions

Emilson Silva

No 5708, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: For a large global economy with normal goods, and an unequal world income distribution, we consider the endogenous formation and stability of an international environmental agreement (IEA) under nationally determined contributions (NDCs). Nations share green R&D efforts and enjoy R&D spillovers if they join an IEA. Nonmembers do not enjoy R&D spillovers. We show that the Grand Coalition is stable under NDCs if all nations are active carbon abatement and R&D contributors. If some nations are inactive, because they lack sufficient income to provide carbon abatement and R&D, the stable coalition under NDCs is the coalition of all active (wealthier) nations.

Keywords: international environmental agreements; self-enforcing; nationally determined contributions; R&D sharing (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D74 F53 H41 Q54 Q55 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.cesifo.org/DocDL/cesifo1_wp5708.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Self-enforcing agreements under unequal nationally determined contributions (2017)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_5708

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Klaus Wohlrabe ().