The Revelation and Delegation Principles in Common Agency Games

David Martimort and Lars Stole

No 575, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: In the context of common agency adverse-selection games we illustrate that the revelation principle cannot be applied to study equilibria of the multi-principal games. We then demonstrate that an extension of the taxation principle – what we term the “delegation principle” – can be used to characterize the set of all common agency equilibria.

Keywords: revelation principle; delegation principle; taxation; principle; common agency; adverse selection. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (17)

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Journal Article: The Revelation and Delegation Principles in Common Agency Games (2002)
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