Members, Joiners, Free-Riders, Supporters

Erik Ansink and Cees Withagen

No 5802, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: We augment the standard cartel formation game from non-cooperative coalition theory, often applied in the context of international environmental agreements on climate change, with the possibility that singletons support coalition formation without becoming coalition members themselves. Rather, their support takes the form of a monetary transfer to the coalition, which increases the members’ payoffs, and thereby provides an incentive for other singletons to join the coalition. We show that, under mild conditions on the costs and benefits of contributing to the public good (i.e. abatement of CO2 emissions), supporters exist in equilibrium. The existence of supporters increases the size of stable coalitions, increases abatement of CO2 emissions, and increases payoffs to each of four types of agents: members, joiners, free-riders, and supporters.

Keywords: coalition formation; public goods; support; transfers; international environmental agreements (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D02 H41 Q54 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_5802

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