Optimal Policies against Profit Shifting: The Role of Controlled-Foreign-Company Rules

Andreas Haufler, Mohammed Mardan and Dirk Schindler

No 5850, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: By introducing controlled-foreign-company (CFC) rules, the parent country of a multinational firm reserves the right to tax the income of the firm’s foreign affiliates if the tax rate in the affiliate’s host country is below a specified threshold. We identify the conditions under which binding CFC rules are part of the optimal tax mix when governments can set the statutory tax rate, a thin capitalization rule and the CFC rule. We also analyze the effects of economic and financial integration on the optimal policy mix. Our results correspond to the actual development of anti-avoidance rules in OECD countries.

Keywords: multinationals; profit shifting; controlled foreign company rules; thin capitalization rules (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F23 H25 H73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.cesifo.org/DocDL/cesifo1_wp5850.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Optimal Policies against Profit Shifting: The Role of Controlled-Foreign-Company Rules (2016)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_5850

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Klaus Wohlrabe (wohlrabe@ifo.de).