Democracy and International Conflict
Alberto Vesperoni () and
No 5856, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo
During the past two centuries, western nations have successively extended the voting franchise to citizens of lower income. We explain this process of democratization as a rational way for incumbent elites to wage war effectively on other nations, as in a strategic game of international conflict handing over military spending decisions to citizens who face a lower tax cost of arming may confer a strategic delegation advantage. We find supporting empirical evidence in case studies of franchise extensions in the United Kingdom, France, and the United States.
Keywords: war; conflict; contest; democracy; franchise extension (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D74 F51 O15 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Working Paper: Democracy and International Conflict (2016)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_5856
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