Fiscal Consolidation and its Cross-Country Effects
Petros Varthalitis and
No 6012, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo
We build a new Keynesian DSGE model consisting of two heterogeneous countries participating in a monetary union. We study how public debt consolidation in a country with high debt (like Italy) affects welfare in a country with solid public finances (like Germany). Our results show that debt consolidation in the high-debt country benefits the country with solid public finances over all time horizons. By constrast, in Italy, namely the country that takes the consolidation measures, such a policy is productive only in the medium and long term. Thus, although there is a conflict of national interests in shorter horizons, there is a common interest in the medium and long term. All this is with optimized feedback policy rules. By contrast, debt consolidation is welfare inferior to non-consolidation for both countries and all the time, if it is implemented in an ad hoc way, like an increase in income taxes. Therefore, the policy mix is important.
Keywords: debt consolidation; Country spillovers; feedback policy rules; new Keynesian (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E60 F30 H60 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
Journal Article: Fiscal consolidation and its cross-country effects (2017)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_6012
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Klaus Wohlrabe ().