The Political Economy of International Organizations

Axel Dreher and Valentin F. Lang

No 6077, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: We review the literature on the political economy of international organizations (IOs). Considering IOs as products of the preferences of various actors rather than monolithic entities we focus on national politicians, international bureaucrats, interest groups, and voters. By looking into the details of decision-making in IOs the literature shows that a focus on states as the prime actors in IOs overlooks important facets of the empirical reality. Mainly focusing on empirical research, we structure the paper according to the four main actors involved and examine how they influence, use, and shape IOs. We find that IO behavior often reflects the interests of politicians, bureaucrats, and interest groups, while the impact of voters is limited. The final section discusses proposals for reforms addressing this weak representation of voter preferences.

Keywords: international organizations; public choice; International Monetary Fund; European Union (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D73 F53 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (21)

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Related works:
Journal Article: The political economy of international organizations (2008)
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