Competition for Natural Resources and the Hold-Up Problem

Carsten Hefeker and Sebastian Kessing

No 6120, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: We study the role of competition for the hold-up problem in foreign direct investment in resource-based industries. The host country government is not only unable to commit not to expropriate investment ex post, but is also unable to commit to the provision of local resources. In the case of competition for local resources this dual commitment problem triggers higher investment levels and increases host country revenues, but hurts pro.ts of international investors.

Keywords: foreign direct investment; natural resources; hold-up problem (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F21 F23 Q34 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Competition for natural resources and the hold-up problem (2017)
Journal Article: Competition for natural resources and the hold‐up problem (2017)
Working Paper: Competition for Natural Resources and the Hold-Up Problem (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_6120

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