Academic Publication Uncertainty and Publishing Behavior: A Game-Theoretic Perspective

João Ricardo Faria and Rajeev Goel

No 6176, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: This paper incorporates publication uncertainty in a game between researchers and journal editors and examines its effects on quantity and quality of published research. A stylized differential Stackelberg game between journal editors and academic authors is considered, where authors seek to maximize satisfaction from publications, while journal editors try to enhance reputations of their journals. Publication probability depends on the number of academic journals. Results show that greater journal competition, generally leading to reduced publication uncertainty, would increase author payoffs by increasing citations and publications. However, it is not clear whether the quality of published research is enhanced. Thus, changes in competition in publishing markets have the potential to exacerbate the quantity-quantity trade offs in research markets.

Keywords: publication uncertainty; journals; publications; citations; research quality; authors; editors (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: A11 A14 C79 L19 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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