The Political Economy of Redistribution Policy

Luna Bellani and Heinrich Ursprung

No 6189, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: We review the literature on the public choice approach to explaining redistribution policies. The focus is on policies that are pursued with the sole reason to redistribute initial endowments. Moreover, we restrict ourselves to redistribution in democracies. In democratic settings, generic redistribution games lack equilibria. Structure-inducing rules that give rise to realistic redistribution patterns may concern the underlying economic model, political institutions, and firmly established preferences, beliefs, and attitudes of the voters. We present the respective lines of argument in turn and then present the related empirical evidence.

Keywords: redistribution; political economy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D31 D72 I38 P16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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