Alternative Objectives in an Oligopoly Model: An Aggregative Game Approach

Richard Cornes and Jun-ichi Itaya ()

No 6191, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: A rapidly growing literature analyzes models in which firms maximize objectives other than profit and enjoy market power. Examples include the labor-managed firm, mixed oligopoly, and delegation models. These models typically retain the aggregative structure of the conventional Cournot model of imperfect competition. We exploit this fact and apply the framework recently developed by Cornes and Hartley (2005, 2011) to analyze the properties of the equilibrium in such games. We show that existing treatments often make more restrictive assumptions than necessary to generate their results. Specifically, we identify conditions sufficient to ensure the existence of a unique equilibrium, and we explore the comparative static properties of these conditions.

Keywords: aggregative game; oligopoly; Hahn's Condition; non-profit maximization; share function (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D43 L21 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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Working Paper: Alternative Objectives in an Oligopoly Model: An Aggregative Game Approach (2016)
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