Evolutionary Rent-Seeking

Burkhard Hehenkamp, Wolfgang Leininger and Alex Possajennikov ()

No 620, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: Tullock’s analysis of rent-seeking is reconsidered from an evolutionary point of view. We show that evolutionarily stable behavior in a rent-seeking contest differs from efficient rent-seeking behavior in a Nash equilibrium. We explore that implications of evolutionary stability for rent-seeking behavior and relate them to the well examined Nash equilibrium behavior. A most interesting result is an overdissipation law, which holds in evolutionary equilibrium.

Date: 2001
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_620

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