Political Preferences for Redistribution in Sweden

Spencer Bastani and Jacob Lundberg

No 6205, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: We examine preferences for redistribution inherent in Swedish tax policy 1971–2012 using the inverse optimal tax approach. The income distribution is carefully characterized with the help of administrative register data and we employ behavioral elasticities reflecting the perceived distortionary effects of taxation. The revealed social welfare weights are high for non-workers, small for low-income earners, and hump-shaped around the median. At the top, they are always negative, especially so during the high-tax years of the 1970s and 80s. The weights on non-workers increased sharply in the 1970s fell drastically in the late 80s/early 90s, and have since then increased.

Keywords: redistribution; social welfare weights; optimal taxation; inverse optimal taxation; social preferences (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D63 H21 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Political preferences for redistribution in Sweden (2017)
Journal Article: Political preferences for redistribution in Sweden (2017)
Working Paper: Political preferences for redistribution in Sweden (2016)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_6205

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