Vertical Licensing, Input Pricing, and Entry

Elpiniki Bakaouka and Chrysovalantou Milliou

No 6316, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: We explore the incentives of a vertically integrated incumbent firm to license the production technology of its core input to an external firm, transforming the licensee into its input supplier. We find that the incumbent opts for licensing even when licensing also transforms the licensee into one of its direct competitors in the final products market. In fact, the licensee's entry into the final products market, although increases the competition and the cost that the licensor faces, it reinforces, instead of weakens, the licensing incentives. Furthermore, the licensee's entry augments the positive welfare implications of vertical licensing.

Keywords: licensing; vertical relations; entry; two-part tariffs; outsourcing (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D45 L13 L22 L24 L42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-ipr and nep-mic
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Related works:
Journal Article: Vertical licensing, input pricing, and entry (2018)
Working Paper: Vertical Licensing, Input Pricing, and Entry (2016)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_6316

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