How Antitrust Enforcement Can Spur Innovation: Bell Labs and the 1956 Consent Decree
Martin Watzinger (),
Markus Nagler and
Monika Schnitzer ()
No 6351, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo Group Munich
We study the 1956 consent decree against the Bell System to investigate whether patents held by a dominant firm are harmful for innovation and if so, whether compulsory licensing can provide an effective remedy. The consent decree settled an antitrust lawsuit that charged Bell with having foreclosed the market for telecommunications equipment. The decree forced Bell to license all its existing patents royalty-free. The compulsory licensing increased follow-on innovation building on Bell patents by 17%. This effect is driven mainly by young and small companies. Yet, innovation increased only outside the telecommunications equipment industry, suggesting that compulsory licensing without structural remedies is ineffective in ending market foreclosure.
Keywords: innovation; antitrust; intellectual property; compulsory licensing (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: O30 O33 O34 K21 L40 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-ind, nep-ino, nep-ipr, nep-law, nep-sbm and nep-tid
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
Working Paper: How Antitrust Enforcement Can Spur Innovation: Bell Labs and the 1956 Consent Decree (2017)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_6351
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo Group Munich Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Klaus Wohlrabe ().