Tailored Bayesian Mechanisms: Experimental Evidence from Two-Stage Voting Games
Dirk Engelmann () and
Hans Peter Grüner
No 6405, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo Group Munich
Optimal voting rules have to be tailored to the underlying distribution of preferences. This paper shows that the introduction of a stage at which agents may themselves choose voting rules according to which they decide in a second stage may increase the sum of individuals’ payoffs if players are not all completely selfish. Our experiments aim to understand how privately informed individuals choose voting rules and vote given these rules. In a setting with an asymmetric distribution of valuations groups that can choose a voting rule do better than those who decide with a given simple majority voting rule.
Keywords: two-stage voting; Bayesian voting; experiments (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D70 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des, nep-exp, nep-hpe and nep-pol
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Working Paper: Tailored Bayesian Mechanisms: Experimental Evidence from Two-Stage Voting Games (2014)
Working Paper: Tailored Bayesian Mechanisms: Experimental Evidence from Two-Stage Voting Games (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_6405
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