Patent Breadth in an International Setting

Eric Bond and Benjamin Zissimos

No 6411, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: We examine the Nash equilibria of a game where two national governments set patent breadth strategically. Broader patents make R&D more attractive, but the effect on static efficiency is nonmonotonic. In a North.South model, where only the North can innovate, harmonization of patent breadth lowers welfare relative to the Nash equilibrium. When both countries can innovate, harmonization toward narrower patent breadth may raise world welfare.

Keywords: coordination; innovation; patent breadth; patent race; R&D (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F02 F13 O30 O31 O32 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ino, nep-ipr and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Related works:
Journal Article: PATENT BREADTH IN AN INTERNATIONAL SETTING (2017)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_6411

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