Trade, Inequality and Distribution-Neutral Fiscal Policy - An Elementary Framework

Sugata Marjit and Lei Yang

No 6474, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: Theoretical discussion on compensating mechanisms involving the Pareto criterion that address inequality rather than absolute welfare is non-existent in trade literature. In a simple HOS model we consider tax-transfer policies that keep the pre-trade degree of inequality unchanged between skilled and unskilled workers rather than the absolute income of the losing group. We discuss the problem of existence of such an inequality-neutral tax rate which generates a positive increment in the after tax skilled wage and unskilled wage. Such a mechanism exists and is independent of whether the tax is progressive or proportional. Thus the compensating mechanism that is available in this standard model is stronger than the conventional Pareto criterion.

Keywords: trade model; wage inequality; compensation mechanism; tax policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D63 F11 H20 H23 J31 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-int
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Working Paper: Trade, Inequality and Distribution-Neutral Fiscal Policy- An Elementary Framework (2017)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_6474

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