Why People Obey the Law: Experimental Evidence from the Provision of Public Goods

Lars Feld and Jean-Robert Tyran

No 651, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: According to economists, severe legal sanctions deter violations of the law. According to legal scholars, people may obey law backed by mild sanctions because of norm-activation. We experimentally investigate the effects of mild and severe legal sanctions in the provision of public goods. The results show that severe sanctions almost perfectly deter free-riding. However, people also obey law backed by mild sanctions if it is accepted in a referendum. We show that voting for mild law induces expectations of cooperation, and that people tend to obey the law if they expect many others to do so.

Keywords: deterrent effect of legal sanctions; expressive law; social norms; public goods; voting. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (15)

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