The Potential Output Gains from Using Optimal Teacher Incentives: An Illustrative Calibration of a Hidden Action Model

Nirav Mehta

No 6598, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: This paper examines the potential output gains from the implementation of optimal teacher incentive pay schemes, by calibrating the Hölmstrom and Milgrom (1987) hidden action model using data from Muralidharan and Sundararaman (2011), a teacher incentive pay experiment implemented in Andhra Pradesh, India. Findings suggest that the introduction of optimal individual incentive-pay schemes could result in very large increases in output, about six times the size of the (significant) results obtained in the experiment.

Keywords: hidden action; empirical contracts; teacher incentive pay (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: I20 J30 J40 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ure
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Journal Article: The potential output gains from using optimal teacher incentives: An illustrative calibration of a hidden action model (2018)
Working Paper: The Potential Output Gains from Using Optimal Teacher Incentives: An Illustrative Calibration of a Hidden Action Model (2018)
Working Paper: The Potential Output Gains from Using Optimal Teacher Incentives: An Illustrative Calibration of a Hidden Action Model (2017)
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