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Self-Allocation in Contests

Axel Bernergard and Karl Wärneryd

No 6636, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo Group Munich

Abstract: We consider contestants who must choose exactly one contest, out of several, to participate in. We show that when the contest technology is of a certain type, or when the number of contestants is large, a self-allocation equilibrium, i.e., one where no contestant would wish to change his choice of contest, results in the allocation of players to contests that maximizes aggregate equilibrium effort. For a class of oligopoly models that are equivalent to contests, this implies output maximization.

Keywords: contests; self-allocation; effort maximization; quantity competition (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D43 D44 D72 D74 L13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des, nep-gth and nep-mic
Date: 2017
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