Self-Allocation in Contests
Axel Bernergard and
No 6636, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo Group Munich
We consider contestants who must choose exactly one contest, out of several, to participate in. We show that when the contest technology is of a certain type, or when the number of contestants is large, a self-allocation equilibrium, i.e., one where no contestant would wish to change his choice of contest, results in the allocation of players to contests that maximizes aggregate equilibrium effort. For a class of oligopoly models that are equivalent to contests, this implies output maximization.
Keywords: contests; self-allocation; effort maximization; quantity competition (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D43 D44 D72 D74 L13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des, nep-gth and nep-mic
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Working Paper: Self-Allocation in Contests (2017)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_6636
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