The Euro Area's Common Pool Problem Revisited: Has the Single Supervisory Mechanism Ameliorated Forbearance and Evergreening
Sven Steinkamp (),
Aaron Tornell and
No 6670, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo Group Munich
The Single Supervisory Mechanism was introduced to eliminate the common-pool problem and limit uncontrolled lending by national central banks (NCBs). We analyze its effectiveness. Second, we model how, by forbearing and providing refinancing credit, NCBs avoid domestic resolution costs and, instead, share potential losses within the Euro Area. This results in “evergreening” of bad loans. Third, we construct a new evergreening index based on a large worldwide survey administered by the ifo institute. Regressions show evergreening is significantly greater in the Euro Area and where banks are in distress. Finally, greater evergreening accompanies higher growth of NCB-credit and Target2-liabilities.
Keywords: single supervisory mechanism; evergreening; nonperforming loans; common-pool problem (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F33 F55 E58 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-eec, nep-mac and nep-mon
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Working Paper: The Euro Area’s Common Pool Problem Revisited: Has the Single Supervisory Mechanism Ameliorated Forbearance and Evergreening? (2017)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_6670
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