Incentives through Inventory Control in Supply Chains
Zhan Qu (),
Horst Raff () and
Nicolas Schmitt ()
No 6705, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo Group Munich
The paper shows that taking inventory control out of the hands of competitive or exclusive retailers and assigning it to a manufacturer increases the value of a supply chain especially for goods whose demand is highly volatile. This is because doing so solves incentive distortions that arise when retailers have to allocate inventory across sales periods, and thus allows for better intertemporal price discrimination. Assigning inventory control to a manufacturer is also shown to have effects on total inventory and social welfare.
Keywords: inventory; supply chain; demand uncertainty; storable good; price discrimination (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L11 L12 L22 L81 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Journal Article: Incentives through inventory control in supply chains (2018)
Working Paper: Incentives through Inventory Control in Supply Chains (2017)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_6705
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