Appointed Public Officials and Local Favoritism: Evidence from the German States
Thushyanthan Baskaran () and
Mariana Lopes da Fonseca
No 6800, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo Group Munich
We study the local favoritism of appointed German state ministers. Matching hand-collected data on ministers’ place of residence to a sample of more than 8,000 west German municipalities during the period 1994–2013, we find that the home municipality of a state minister experiences higher employment growth than control municipalities. Given the institutional context, this effect is ostensibly due to apolitical favoritism (home bias) rather than electoral considerations. We conclude that favoritism may lead to a distortion in the allocation of public resources even in contexts with strong political institutions.
Keywords: distributive politics; favoritism; employment growth (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D73 H70 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pol and nep-ure
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Working Paper: Appointed public officials and local favoritism: Evidence from the German states (2018)
Working Paper: Appointed Public Officials and Local Favoritism: Evidence from the German States (2017)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_6800
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