Voting in Hiring Committees: Which "Almost" Rule is Optimal?
Eyal Baharad and
No 6851, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo Group Munich
We determine the scoring rule that is most likely to select a high-ability candidate. A major result is that neither the widely used plurality rule nor the inverse-plurality rule are ever optimal, and that the Borda rule is hardly ever optimal. Furthermore, we show that only the almost-plurality, the almost-inverse-plurality, and the almost-Borda rule can be optimal. Which of the “almost” rules is optimal depends on the likelihood that a candidate has high ability and how likely committee members are to correctly identify the abilities of the different candidates.
Keywords: committee decisions; scoring rules; “Almost” voting rules (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-lab and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_6851
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo Group Munich Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Klaus Wohlrabe ().