Economics at your fingertips  

Optimal Pollution Control in a Mixed Oligopoly with Research Spillovers

Shoji Haruna and Rajeev Goel

No 6909, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo Group Munich

Abstract: We study optimal pollution abatement under a mixed oligopoly game when firms engage in emissions-reducing R&D that is imperfectly appropriable. The regulator uses a tax to curb emissions. Results show that in a mixed oligopoly, the public firm has positive emissions reduction in equilibrium; however, emissions reductions of the private firm could be positive or zero. Under certain conditions, the optimal pollution tax is positive; otherwise, the tax reverts to a subsidy. Comparing mixed and private duopolies, privatization leads to reductions in R&D and output, but to an increase in overall emissions, so privatization tends to make the environment worse.

Keywords: mixed oligopoly; R&D; pollution; spillovers; taxation; subsidy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D43 D62 O33 Q55 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ene, nep-env and nep-gth
Date: 2018
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link) (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Optimal pollution control in a mixed oligopoly with research spillovers (2019) Downloads
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link:

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo Group Munich Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Klaus Wohlrabe ().

Page updated 2019-10-14
Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_6909