Optimal Taxation in a Unionised Economy
Vidar Christiansen and
No 6954, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo Group Munich
Unions appear to have an aversion to wage disparities among their members, leading to wage compression. This paper analyses the consequences of this for income tax policy. In a two-sector general equilibrium model we highlight the tradeoff between correcting the resource misallocation created by wage compression and the government’s distributional objectives. Where the union’s aversion to wage dispersion is strong, tax policy can do little to correct the distortion in the supply of trained labour, though it can come closer to achieving distributional aims. Where wage compression is less pronounced, tax policy can have significant effects on resource misallocation, at the expense of its distributional goals.
Keywords: income taxation; optimal taxation; unionized economy; wage compression (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H21 H24 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-lab, nep-pbe and nep-pub
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_6954
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo Group Munich Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Klaus Wohlrabe ().