Can there be a Market for Cheap-Talk Information? An Experimental Investigation
Antonio Cabrales (),
Piero Gottardi () and
Miguel A. Meléndez-Jiménez
No 6975, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo
This paper reports on experiments testing the viability of markets for cheap talk information. We find that the poor quality of the information transmitted leads to a collapse of information markets. The reasons for this are surprising given the previous experimental results on cheap-talk games. Our subjects provide low-quality information even when doing so does not increase their monetary payoff.
Keywords: experiment; cheap talk; auction; information acquisition; information sale (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D83 C72 G14 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des, nep-exp and nep-gth
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Journal Article: Can there be a market for cheap-talk information? An experimental investigation (2020)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_6975
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