Can there be a Market for Cheap-Talk Information? An Experimental Investigation

Antonio Cabrales, Francesco Feri, Piero Gottardi and Miguel Meléndez-Jiménez ()

No 6975, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: This paper reports on experiments testing the viability of markets for cheap talk information. We find that the poor quality of the information transmitted leads to a collapse of information markets. The reasons for this are surprising given the previous experimental results on cheap-talk games. Our subjects provide low-quality information even when doing so does not increase their monetary payoff.

Keywords: experiment; cheap talk; auction; information acquisition; information sale (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D83 G14 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des, nep-exp and nep-gth
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Related works:
Journal Article: Can there be a market for cheap-talk information? An experimental investigation (2020)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_6975

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