Mine, Ours or Yours? Unintended Framing Effects in Dictator Games

Andreas Bergh and Philipp Christoph Wichardt

No 7049, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: This paper reports results from a classroom dictator game comparing the effects of three different sets of standard instructions. The results show that seemingly small differences in instructions induce fundamentally different perceptions regarding entitlement. Behavior is affected accordingly, i.e. instructions inducing subjects to perceive the task as distributive rather than a task of generosity lead to higher allocations to receivers (average 52% vs. 35%). A theoretical explanation integrating monetary as well as social incentives and emphasizing potential effects of uncertainty about the latter is discussed (cf. Bergh and Wichardt, 2018).

Keywords: dictator games; framing effects; property rights; social preferences (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 C91 D63 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-exp and nep-gth
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Working Paper: Mine, Ours or Yours? Unintended Framing Effects in Dictator Games (2018)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_7049

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