The Better Route to Global Tax Coordination: Gradualism or Multilateralism?

Kai Konrad and Marcel Thum

No 7305, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: In the context of international tax coordination incomplete information is one of the well-known frictions that can lead to bargaining failure and might explain a lack of observed coordination. We consider international negotiations about tax coordination under complete and incomplete information. We identify the conditions for multilateral negotiations to be more likely to be successful than gradual/sequential negotiation approaches and compare different routes of sequential bargaining. Under plausible conditions, full-scale global coordination is least likely to emerge if the negotiations take place sequentially, and if the negotiations with the most unpredictable country take place last.

Keywords: tax competition; tax cooperation; multilateral negotiations; sequential negotiations; ultimatum bargaining; acceptance uncertainty (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F52 F55 H25 H77 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-int, nep-pbe and nep-pub
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Journal Article: The better route to global tax coordination: Gradualism or multilateralism? (2021)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_7305

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