Is it the Gums, Teeth or the Bite? Effectiveness of Dimensions of Enforcement in Curbing Corruption
Rajeev Goel and
James W. Saunoris
No 7316, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo Group Munich
Adding a new dimension to determinants of corruption, this paper examines the effectiveness of enforcement in reducing corruption. We compare the influences of latent enforcement (police, judicial, and prosecutorial employment) versus actual enforcement (conviction rates) and enforcing institutions. Results based on data for more than 80 countries show that piecemeal enforcement to combat corruption by increasing enforcement employment is ineffective, rather comprehensive improvements in institutions by strengthening the rule of law or regulatory quality bear greater results. Thus, when it comes to corruption control, strong gums (institutions) are more effective than showing teeth (enforcement employment) or the bite (conviction rates).
Keywords: corruption; enforcement; conviction rate; police; judges; prosecutors; institutions; regulatory quality; rule of law (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K42 F50 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_7316
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