Patient vs. Provider Incentives in Long-Term Care
Martin Hackmann and
R. Vincent Pohl ()
No 7373, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo
How do patient and provider incentives affect mode and cost of long-term care? Our analysis of 1 million nursing home stays yields three main insights. First, Medicaid-covered residents prolong their stays instead of transitioning to community-based care due to limited cost-sharing. Second, nursing homes shorten Medicaid stays when capacity binds to admit more profitable out-of-pocket payers. Third, providers react more elastically to financial incentives than patients, so moving to episode-based provider reimbursement is more effective in shortening Medicaid stays than increasing resident cost-sharing. Moreover, we do not find evidence for health improvements due to longer stays for marginal Medicaid beneficiaries.
Keywords: long-term care; nursing homes; patient incentives; provider incentives; cost-sharing; episode-based reimbursement; medicaid (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H51 H75 I11 I13 I18 J14 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-age, nep-hea and nep-ias
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
Working Paper: Patient vs. Provider Incentives in Long Term Care (2018)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_7373
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Klaus Wohlrabe ().