Bank Regulation, Network Topology, and Systemic Risk: Evidence from the Great Depression

Sanjiv Das (), Kris James Mitchener and Angela Vossmeyer

No 7425, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: We study how bank regulation interacts with network topology to influence systemic stability. Employing unique hand-collected data on the correspondent network for all U.S. banks on the eve of the Great Depression and a methodology that captures bank credit risk and network position, we explore how the pyramid-shaped network topology was inherently fragile and systemically risky. We measure its contribution to banking distress in the early 1930s, and show that a bank’s network position as well as the risk of its network neighbors are strong predictors of bank survivorship. Institutional alternatives, such as branch banking, and alternative topologies appear to deliver networks that are more stable than the network that existed in 1929.

Keywords: systemic risk; banking networks; Great Depression; peer effects; branch banking; model comparison (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E42 E44 G01 G18 G21 L10 N12 N22 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ban, nep-his and nep-rmg
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.cesifo.org/DocDL/cesifo1_wp7425.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Bank Regulation, Network Topology, and Systemic Risk: Evidence from the Great Depression (2018)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_7425

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Klaus Wohlrabe ().