Endogenous Timing and Income Inequality in the Voluntary Provision of Public Goods: Theory and Experiment
Jun-ichi Itaya (),
Atsue Mizushima and
No 7441, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo Group Munich
This paper investigates how the heterogenous incomes and preferences of potential donors affect the timing of contribution decisions when it is endogenously determined by contributors themselves. More specifically, we use a simple setting with two donors, Cobb-Douglas preferences, and complete information to investigate how income inequality affects the endogenous choices of contribution timing and the level of the voluntary supplied public goods. This paper obtains the following results. First, when income is extremely unequal, potential contributors are indifferent between the timing choices of simultaneous and sequential moves, even if they have different preferences towards a public good. Second, as income inequality decreases, the simultaneous move-game is increasingly likely to emerge, because all potential contributors prefer to act as a leader. Third, in the presence of multiple public goods, contributors with higher valuations for one public good tend to be first contributors to that one. Fourth, these theoretical predictions regarding the timing decisions of individuals are not supported by the laboratory experiment, although those regarding individuals’ contribution decisions are consistent with the experimental results.
Keywords: Nash equilibrium; Stackelberg equilibrium; public good; endogenous timing; voluntary provision; income distribution (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D31 H41 H42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp and nep-gth
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_7441
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo Group Munich Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Klaus Wohlrabe ().