A prospect-theory model of voter turnout

Oliver Herrmann, Richard Jong-A-Pin () and Lambert Schoonbeek

No 7541, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: We incorporate prospect-theory preferences in a game-theoretic model to study voter turnout. We show that voter turnout is heavily affected by agents having subjective reference points with respect to the vote or abstain decision and their subjective probability weighting in the decision-making process. Using empirically based parameter values, we show that our model has lower prediction error than other game-theoretic models with standard expected-utility preferences. We also find that our model maintains desirable comparative statics effects and leads to higher turnout predictions in larger electorates.

Keywords: voting behavior; Downsian paradox; prospect-theory preferences (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-mic, nep-pol and nep-upt
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.cesifo.org/DocDL/cesifo1_wp7541.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: A prospect-theory model of voter turnout (2019)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_7541

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Klaus Wohlrabe ().