Deterrence and Morale in Taxation: An Empirical Analysis

Bruno Frey and Lars Feld

No 760, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: The standard model of tax evasion based on the subjective expected utility maximization does not perform particularly well in econometric analyses: it predicts too little evasion and produces unsatisfactory econometric parameter estimates. The model is extended by looking at how the tax authority deals with the taxpayers. Based on econometric estimates, it is shown that taxpayers’ tax morale is raised when the tax officials treat them with respect. In contrast, when tax officials solely rely on deterrence taxpayers tend to respond by actively trying to avoid taxation.

JEL-codes: D60 H20 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (144)

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