Benefits of Regulation vs. Competition Where Inequality Is High: The Case of Mobile Telephony in South Africa

Ryan Hawthorne and Lukasz Grzybowski

No 7703, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: We test for the distributional effects of regulation and entry in the mobile telecommunications sector in a highly unequal country, South Africa. Using six waves of a consumer survey of over 134,000 individuals between 2009-2014, we estimate a discrete-choice model allowing for individual-specific price-responsiveness and preferences for network operators. Next, we use a demand and supply equilibrium framework to simulate prices and the distribution of welfare without entry and mobile termination rate regulation. We find that regulation benefits consumers significantly more than entry does, and that high-income consumers and city-dwellers benefit more in terms of increased consumer surplus.

Keywords: mobile telecommunications; competition; entry; discrete choice; inequality (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L13 L40 L50 L96 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-dcm, nep-ict, nep-ind, nep-pay and nep-reg
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_7703

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