Bribing in Team Contests

Serhat Dogan, Emin Karagözoğlu, Kerim Keskin and Çağrı Sağlam

No 8096, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: We study bribing in a sequential team contest with multiple pairwise battles. We allow for asymmetries in winning prizes and marginal costs of effort; and we characterize the conditions under which (i) a player in a team is offered a bribe by the owner of the other team and (ii) she accepts the bribe. We show that these conditions depend on the ratios of players’ winning prizes and marginal costs of effort: the team owner chooses to bribe the player with the most favorable winning prize to marginal cost of effort ratio, and offer a bribe that leaves her indifferent between accepting (and exerting zero effort) and not accepting (and exerting her optimal effort). In some cases, the competition between players and the negative consequences of one player receiving a bribe on the team performance can drag down equilibrium bribe to zero. We also study the impact of changes in winning prizes and marginal costs of effort on equilibrium bribing behavior.

Keywords: bribing; contest games; pairwise battles; team contests (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D73 D74 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-hrm, nep-mic, nep-ore and nep-spo
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Journal Article: Bribing in team contests (2021)
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