Reference-Dependent Preferences, Time Inconsistency, and Unfunded Pensions

Torben M. Andersen, Joydeep Bhattacharya and Qing Liu

No 8260, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: In the real world, public pay-as-you-go pension (PAYG) schemes are popular and co-exist with private, retirement-saving schemes. This is true even in dynamically efficient economies where such pensions offer a lower return. The classic Aaron-Samuelson result argues that, in theory, this is impossible. Later work has shown that it may be possible if agents, left on their own, undersave due to myopia or time-inconsistency. In that case, if the government is paternalistic, a welfare rationale for PAYG pensions arises but only if voluntary retirement saving is fully crowded out because of a binding borrowing constraint. This paper generalizes the Aaron-Samuelson discussion to the reference-dependent utility setup of Kőszegi and Rabin (2009) where undersaving happens naturally. No borrowing constraint is imposed. In this case, it is possible to offer a non-paternalistic, welfare rationale for return-dominated, PAYG pensions to coexist with private retirement saving.

Keywords: reference-dependence; crowding-out; pensions; dynamic efficiency (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E60 H55 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-age, nep-mac, nep-ore and nep-upt
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Working Paper: Reference-dependent preferences, time inconsistency, and unfunded pensions (2020)
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