The Conservation Multiplier

Bard Harstad

No 8283, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: EvEvery government that controls an exhaustible resource must decide whether to exploit it or to conserve and thereby let the subsequent government decide whether to exploit or conserve. This paper develops a model of this situation and shows when a small probability that some future government will exploit has a multiplier effect on earlier decisions. The multiplier can be taken advantage of by a lobby paying for exploitation, or by a donor compensating for conservation. The analysis also uncovers when compensations are optimally offered to the president, the party in power, the general public, or to the lobby group.

Keywords: dynamic games; exhaustible resources; deforestation; political economy; lobbying; multiple principals; conservation. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 D72 O13 Q57 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-env, nep-gth and nep-pol
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Related works:
Journal Article: The Conservation Multiplier (2023)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_8283

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