Designing the Policy Mix in a Monetary Union
No 8321, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo
This paper studies the design of the policy mix in a monetary union, that is, the institutional arrangement specifying the relationships between the various policymakers present in the union and the extent of their capacity of action. It is assumed that policymakers do not cooperate. Detailing several institutional variants imposed on an otherwise standard macromodel of a monetary union, we prove that there is no Pareto-superior design when cooperation between policymakers is impossible.
Keywords: monetary union; fiscal policy; monetary policy; cooperation; policy mix (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E58 E62 F45 H76 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cba, nep-mac and nep-mon
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_8321
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