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Efficiency Wages with Motivated Agents

Jesper Armouti-Hansen, Lea Cassar (), Anna Deréky and Florian Engl

No 8474, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: Many jobs are connected to a prosocial mission, i.e., they have a positive impact on society beyond profit-maximization. This paper uses a modified principal-agent gift-exchange game with positive externality (mission treatment) to study how the mission interacts with the use of efficiency wages in motivating effort. We find that, compared to a standard gift-exchange game (GE treatment), the presence of the mission shifts the agents’ effort choice function upwards without affecting its slope. This means that mission and efficiency wages are independent in motivating effort and, thus, that if principals were profit-maximizers, wage offers should be the same in both treatments. However, principals offer higher wages in the mission treatment. We show that this is due to principals in the GE treatment highly underestimating agents' reciprocity and thereby offering wages below the profit-maximizing level. The results from two robustness-checks further suggest that our findings are unlikely to be driven by a simple efficiency effect but, rather, by the presence of the positive externality { independently, however, from the quality of the mission-matching.

Keywords: mission motivation; gift exchange; biased beliefs; efficiency wages (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D23 M52 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-hrm and nep-soc
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1) Track citations by RSS feed

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