Selection into Leadership and Dishonest Behavior of Leaders: A Gender Experiment
Holger A. Rau and
No 8514, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo
Leaders often have to weigh ethical against monetary consequences. We experimentally analyze such a dilemma. We measure individual honesty preferences in a payoff reporting game. Subsequently, subjects can apply for leadership and report payoffs for a group. In a control, we assign leadership randomly. Women behave less dishonestly than men when reporting for themselves. They increase dishonesty when deciding as leaders. In the control, female leaders do not increase dishonesty. We find that honesty preferences do not explain women’s selection into leadership. A follow-up reveals that women who select into leadership become dishonest when believing that group members prefer dishonesty.
Keywords: leadership; decision for others; lab experiment; gender differences; dishonesty (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 H26 J16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-exp, nep-hrm, nep-lab and nep-soc
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_8514
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